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Abstract
I evaluate in this paper the impact of Free-Trade Areas (FTAs) on the world trade system using a model
that emphasizes the role of oligopolistic industries in the shaping of trade policies, on account of both strategic
and political reasons. In this context, I find that FTAs are likely a “building block” of the multilateral system. One
reason for that regards the finding that FTAs induce their members to reduce their external tariffs, thus ensuring
a move toward “trade creation.” Among other things, this result reflects the facts that a FTA weakens the profit-
shifting motive for protection (the “strategic effect”) and makes political influences less effective (the “distributive
effect”). FTAs are shown to enhance also the prospects of a multilateral liberalization, by strengthening the
support for the latter. This occurs precisely because of the softening of the strategic and the distributive motives
for protection that accompany FTAs, as this will induce governments to center their trade regime decisions more
on efficiency than on special interests criteria.
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I – Introduction
The fast and notable expansion of preferential – or  regional – trade agreements (PTAs)
throughout the world in the last decade is a fact that has attracted increasing attention from trade
economists.1 As asserted by Bhagwati (1993), the concerns regarding such phenomenon can be
divided in two categories: the “static” issues, which refer mainly to the impact of PTAs on the
world trade flows and welfare; and the “dynamic” time-path issues, which relate to the impact of
PTAs on the incentives for further non-discriminatory liberalization. This paper addresses both
kinds of issues in an oligopolistic-political-economy framework, focusing on preferential
arrangements in the form of free-trade areas (FTAs).2
I identify new reasons that make the formation of FTAs helpful to the multilateral trade
system under both the “static” and the “dynamic” time-path perspectives. I show first that
member countries will tend to reduce their external tariffs once they eliminate the intra-FTA trade
barriers. Using a simple model, I find four reinforcing reasons leading to that result. Two of them –
the change in the terms of trade effect and the “tariff revenue effect” – were already explored by
others, as Richardson (1993) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999). The other two, however, are novel in
the literature.
The “strategic effect,” which arises under oligopolistic structures, indicates that a country’s
profit-shifting motive for protection is weakened when the country joins a FTA. Intuitively, this
happens because under the FTA, while the external tariffs still shift profits from the outside firms
to the domestic ones, the partners’ firms capture part of that benefit. This decreased ability to shift
profits from foreign firms to the domestic ones, in turn, makes each FTA government more
inclined to lower its external tariffs.
Furthermore, if the oligopolistic firms are politically active, tariffs serve also a distributive
device, by transferring domestic surplus from consumers to producers. I show that a FTA weakens
such motivation for protection as well, originating the “distributive effect.” At an intuitive level,
this happens because with the FTA the domestic firms lose market share in their home market to
their counterparts from the partner countries. As a result, the FTA governments’ ability to use
tariffs to transfer surplus from consumers to producers by means of a higher price loses some of its
                                                       
1 The WTO reports in its web page, as updated in June 2000, that “nearly all of the WTO's 136 Members have notified
participation in one or more regional trade agreements (RTAs). [...] In the period 1948-1994, the GATT received 124
notifications of RTAs (relating to trade in goods), and since the creation of the WTO in 1995, 90 additional arrangements
covering trade in goods or services have been notified. [...] Out of the total of 214 agreements or enlargements so far
notified to the GATT/WTO, 134 are deemed to be currently in force.”2
effectiveness, since part of that benefit now goes to the partners’ firms. This effect further induces
the FTA governments to lower its external tariffs.
The external tariffs’ reduction is itself a sensible argument in favor of FTAs, at least when
evaluated in Bhagwati’s “static” sense. And under this paper’s framework, it is strong enough
even to ensure “trade creation” between FTA members and non-members. Such trade creation,
although not contingent upon political economy considerations, is strengthened by the
governments’ political motivation. The latter, by amplifying the distributive and the strategic
effects, induces a sharper reduction of the external tariffs and, as a result, more trade creation.
With respect to the “dynamic” time-path issues, I show that, although a government may
not support a welfare-improving multilateral liberalization (ML), such possibility becomes less
likely precisely when the country is integrated within a FTA – or within a larger one. In that case,
the strategic and the distributive effects reduce the importance of the political process in the
determination of the country’s trade barriers. As a result, its government start centering its trade
regime decisions more on efficiency than on special interests criteria, becoming consequently less
inclined to hinder an efficient (welfare-improving) ML.
There are others who attempt to examine the consequences of PTAs under oligopolistic
settings, but these are still scarce. One example is Yi (1996), who studies the welfare effects of
customs unions, but focuses on the impact of distinct rules of CUs formation on the world trade
system. Another is Krishna (1998), who also adopts a political economy setup to address questions
similar to those analyzed here. Krishna’s findings, however, indicate that FTAs are a potential
danger to the multilateral trade system, as he evaluates them as necessarily trade diverting and
also because such trade diversion could induce the preferential partners to stop supporting a ML.
These findings stand in stark contrast with the results of this paper. As I use a model similar to
Krishna’s, but avoiding his assumption of “exogenous” external tariffs, the importance of
incorporating tariff endogeneity becomes clear: the external tariffs` reduction induced by FTAs,
and in particular the “strategic” and the “distributive” effects, which reinforce the FTAs trade
creating aspect and facilitate the support of ML, are ruled out in Krishna’s analysis by
construction.3
                                                                                                                                                                                       
2 As pointed out by the WTO (1995), most of the current PTAs are indeed in the form of FTAs, while only a few
constitute customs unions (CUs).
3 I make a more complete analysis of the effects of endogenizing tariffs in Krishna’s setting in Ornelas (2000). In the
current paper, by contrast, I also depart from his framework in the political economy structure. In particular, I assume
more general preferences for the policymakers and, contrary to Krishna, I make the political influences explicit. In this
respect, as in Grossman and Helpman (1994), I allow the oligopolistic sector to shape its government’s “political-support
function” by means of financial “contributions.” As Section IV attests, this change entirely alters the analysis of how the3
There are also a number of studies attempting to analyze the consequences of PTAs under
other perspectives. Their basic assumptions and specific modeling strategies vary substantially,
and as a consequence contradictory results are often found in the literature. One could cite, for
instance, Krishna (1998) and McLaren (1999) as examples showing that PTAs might be harmful to
the multilateral system. In contrast, Baldwin (1995) and Ethier (1998) constitute examples of studies
pointing to the other direction, i.e., evaluating the preferential initiatives as a “building block” of
the multilateral system.4 Still, one could point to contributions that are essentially ambiguous in
their conclusions, as e.g. Bagwell and Staiger (1997a and 1997b) and Riezman (1999).
This paper, nonetheless, aims to contribute to this literature by focusing on a dimension
still understudied, which presumes that oligopolistic industries, while responsible for substantial
share of the world trade flows, constitute also preeminent forces in the establishment of
protectionist trade policies, on account of both strategic and political reasons. That oligopolistic
behavior might constitute by itself a reason for protection is a well-known fact, as the literature of
strategic trade policy has demonstrated.5 Similarly, oligopolistic industries are also often regarded
as politically active.6 There has not been, however, a systematic analysis of how the incentives to
protect an oligopolistic industry and how the industry’s political activities change when its country
enters in a FTA. This paper aims to start filling up such gap.
The remaining of the paper is structured as follows. The model is detailed in the next
section. In Section III I evaluate how a FTA affects its members’ external tariffs and world trade
flows, while in Section IV I study its impact on the support of a multilateral liberalization. Section
V concludes.
II – The Model
The model’s basic structure is similar to that of Krishna (1998). However, I depart
considerably from his modeling strategy by endogenizing tariffs and in the whole specification of
the political economy setup.
There are two sectors, one competitive (X) and another oligopolistic (Q). Both goods are
homogeneous, produced under constant returns to scale and use only labor (L) as input. I
                                                                                                                                                                                       
support for a ML is affected by FTAs. And in fact, as I shall point out in Section II, Krishna’s assumption that
governments care only about producers’ profits arises as a very special case of my specification.
4 This phrasing is also from Bhagwati (1991), who first asked whether PTAs are “stumbling blocks” or “building blocks”
of the multilateral trade system.
5 See Brander (1995) for a survey.
6 Trefler (1993), e.g., finds that seller concentration is a significant explanatory factor for the U.S. levels of protection.4
normalize units so that one unit of X requires one unit of L, while each unit of Q requires c > 0
units of L. Technologies are the same across countries and L is inelastically supplied in every
country. Choosing good X as numeraire, any equilibrium with diversified production requires
wages set to one and implies a marginal cost of c to produce Q. To simplify matters, I assume the
existence of only one oligopolistic firm per country. Thus, trade takes place only because of the
oligopolistic behavior in the market of Q.
I assume the existence of N symmetric countries, with N ‡ 3. In the oligopolistic sector,
every firm sells in every country, but by selling abroad they bear an increase in their marginal cost,
brought by specific import tariffs, t.7 Thus, a firm selling in its home country faces a marginal cost
of c, but one of c + tj if it sells in foreign country j. In each of the national markets, assumed to be
segmented, the firms compete in a Cournot fashion, whence a foreign firm f selling in the “home
country” H takes th and the sales of all other firms as given and solves:







f ( ) ( ) - + ,
where qhf represents how much a foreign firm sells in country H, whose inverse demand is given
by P(Qh), with Qh representing H’s consumption of the oligopolistic good. For the local firm, the
problem is analogous, being changed only because it does not face any tariff when selling at home.
I assume that  H’s representative consumer has a quasilinear utility function  U with a
quadratic non-linear part, which generates a linear demand for the oligopolistic good, represented
as  Q A P h h = - . The demand for the competitive good is then found residually as
X L Q P Q L AQ Q h h h h h h h = - = - - ( ) ( ).
2 2
A brief discussion of the assumptions is opportune here. Market segmentation, together
with constant marginal costs and a quasilinear utility function, assures that the sales decisions of
every firm are independent across markets. Without that, there would be a full interdependence
between the (non-cooperative) trade policies of  every country, complicating the analysis
considerably. Moreover, while this assumption does not seem too unrealistic, it is also consistent
with much of the literature using oligopolies in international trade theory, in particular that of
strategic trade policies (see Brander, 1995). Demand linearity is assumed to simplify matters as
well.8
  I now solve for the equilibrium sales in terms of th, A, c and N. Since preferences and
technology are the same for everyone, the only distinction with respect to the quantities sold in a
                                                       
7 I ignore transport costs, which are inconsequential for the analysis, and treat the import tariffs as if they were non-
discriminatory, unless the country is within a FTA. Nevertheless, because of the symmetry across countries, in the
absence of FTAs, nondiscrimination is actually an equilibrium result.5
given market regards the origin of the firm, whether domestic or foreign. In an equilibrium
without trade agreements, they correspond, respectively, to:
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One can also easily check that the profit of a firm in any market is given just by the square
of its sales volume there. Consequently, it follows from (1) that a firm always benefits from a tariff
in its home country, but always loses from tariffs elsewhere.
In each country, supply and demand of Q are equalized in equilibrium, while trade balance
is obtained by the flow of the competitive good. Nevertheless, because of the model’s symmetry,
each economy has in equilibrium no net imports of Q, though each exports Q to and imports Q
from all others.
My definition of the governments’ preferences is analogous to the one used by Grossman
and Helpman (1994), who assume that governments value a dollar received as a “contribution” (D)
potentially more than a dollar added to general welfare, W.9 Thus, the government of a generic
country H has its payoff specified as:
Gh(th, Dh) = Wh(th) + bDh ,  with b ‡ 0 and constant.10
I incorporate political activities with a simple principal-agent framework, in the following







the contribution (Dh) given to the local government. As in Grossman and Helpman (1995), I assume
that the firms are unable to coordinate themselves to lobby internationally and that their market
behavior is non-cooperative as well. The goal of a lobby is to affect the policymaker’s tariff choice.
Since the firm knows its government’s preferences, it can map tariffs to  Dh, then balancing
marginal gains (with higher tariffs) against marginal losses (from numeraire given to the
policymaker). The game, taking the trade regime as given, can then be summarized as:
(S1)  Each firm offers a “menu” of choices composed by pairs (t, D) to its government.
(S2)  Given the menu offered, each government chooses one pair (t, D) or uses its best outside
option, (t*, 0), where t* is the tariff level that maximizes domestic welfare.
(S3)  Given the tariffs, the firms decide simultaneously how much to sell in each market.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
8 The dependence of the paper’s results on the assumption of demand linearity is further discussed in the Appendix.
9 These contributions can be understood also as a measure of the “effectiveness” of more general lobby activities,
evaluated in terms of the numeraire.
10 If b = 0, political economy issues do not arise. On the other hand, Krishna’s (1998) assumption that governments care
only about producer’s profits can be represented under this formulation as the special case where b ﬁ ¥. As shall be
clear below, in such case tariffs would be always prohibitive.6
Stages (S1) and (S2) take place in isolation in each country, but at (S3) the firms’ decisions
depend on the worldwide choices at (S2). In equilibrium, H’s oligopolistic firm requests a tariff th
and choose to donate an amount Dh to its government when solving the problem:
h h
h
h D t D t Max
h h
- p ) (  
,
,          (2)
subject to the government’s individual rationality constraint (IRg), Gh(thh, Dh) ‡ Wh(th*).11
A consequence of the principal-agent specification employed here is that, in equilibrium,
the resources Dh received by the government do not affect its payoff, since IRg is always satisfied
with equality. Thus, the lobby activities in this model serve only as a way for the oligopolistic firms
to extract an extra-surplus from their home countries’ consumers.12 Since in equilibrium a firm
offers only one pair (Dh*,  th) to its government, and because IRg is binding, we find (after
substituting for the definition of Gh) that:
Dh* = [Wh(th*) – Wh(th)]/b ‡ 0.        (3)
Because b reduces Wh(th) – through its effect on the equilibrium th – but increases Dh*’s
denominator, the relationship between Dh* and the political parameter is ambiguous. With non-
prohibitive tariffs, it is  typically “U-shaped,” with the change in  Wh(th) prevailing when  b
approaches the level that makes tariffs prohibitive, but not when it is close to zero.
The tariff choice (or, strictly speaking, the choice of the tariff in excess to its welfare-
maximizing level), which is constrained by its “cost,” Dh*, completes the firm’s problem. Using (3),
government H’s problem (2) can be rewritten as:
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whose last term is a constant and where CSh and Th represent, respectively, the home country’s
consumer surplus and tariff revenue. The problem’s FOC is therefore:
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where thd is the equilibrium tariff level. If (4) has an interior solution, (5) holds with equality.
Otherwise, the tariff will be set to a prohibitive level. Notice also that the difference between the
“optimal tariff” (th*) and the “politically optimal tariff” (thd) – henceforth just the “political tariff” –
                                                       
11 Note that the timing within the second stage is irrelevant, as a direct consequence of the governments’ “horizontal”
reaction functions when selecting their optimum tariffs. This explains the absence of pjh, j „ h, in problem (2). That is,
since pjh is affected only by tj, which is entirely determined by the internal political game in country j, firm h does not
need to consider it when lobbying for th.7
is due only to the “extra weight” b posted on phh, making this formulation a version of the general
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The political tariff thd is increasing in b (and strictly increasing when the solution is interior),
and this has a straightforward intuition. The oligopolistic firm will be more willing to lobby for a
higher tariff the “cheaper” protection is – or equivalently, the more sensitive to contributions its
government is –, and therefore the equilibrium tariff ought to be increasing in b. If b is too high
(above ½), the oligopolistic firm obtains a prohibitive tariff – of (A –  c)/2 or more. I shall
nevertheless restrict the analysis to the more interesting – and certainly closer to the real practices –
case where b < ½, thus assuring that non-prohibitive tariffs will arise in equilibrium.
Note, in addition, that tariffs are strictly positive even if b = 0. This protectionist bias is the
result of two forces. One is the typical terms of trade motivation, as here no country is “small” in
the theoretical sense. The other is the tariffs’ strategic content, as typically emphasized in the
literature of strategic trade policy. Here, a government is able to increase the marginal costs of the
foreign firms selling in the domestic market by raising its import tariff levels, thus creating a cost
advantage to the domestic producer. This makes the foreign firms lose market share to the
domestic producer, who increases local sales and profits. Although such motivation for protection
arises despite of political economy considerations, it is reinforced by the latter, as a higher b makes
governments more concerned (in equilibrium) about producers’ surplus, relative to consumers’. I
nevertheless postpone a more thoroughly discussion of the motivations for protection to the next
section, where I appraise also the effects of a FTA on each of them.
Up to now, I ignored the possibility of trade agreements. The determination of the
(external) political tariffs and the equilibrium contribution levels with a FTA in place is, however,
totally analogous to the preceding analysis. The only change is the introduction of a constraint
setting tariffs within the FTA to zero. With a multilateral free-trade agreement in place, on the
other hand, all tariffs are eliminated and there is actually no further trade policy to be chosen.
                                                                                                                                                                                       
12 Giving all the bargaining power to the oligopolistic firms is, in fact, unessential for the analysis. I indicate in Section IV
the limited impact that providing the governments with part of the rents from the political process would have on the
paper’s results.8
III – FTAs, External Tariffs and World Trade Flows
I evaluate first the impact of a FTA between M countries on their external tariffs, with a
FTA meaning that every firm within the area will face zero tariffs when selling at any of the
members’ markets. That is, I analyze how the internal free-trade affects the members’ incentives in
the determination of their external tariffs. GATT’s Article XXIV establishes that they cannot be
increased, but here it is actually not binding, as Proposition 1 asserts.
PROPOSITION 1: When a group of M countries, M ˛ [2, N – 1], creates a FTA, they are induced to
reduce also their external tariffs, and to reduce them more deeply the larger is the FTA.
Proof: Generalizing equations (1) to incorporate the effects of the FTA and denoting by te the external tariff
set under the FTA, one finds that:
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where h, p and f index, respectively, the home country firm, its partners’ and the firms outside the FTA.
Given those quantities, the home country variables under the FTA,  CSM(te),  TM(te) and  PM(te), can be
straightforwardly computed. The FTA “political tariff” maximizes the sum CSM(te) + TM(te) + (1 +b) PM(te),
whence we find that:
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which is clearly decreasing in M.13 Therefore, after a FTA has been formed (or enlarged), its members will
find a reduction of its external tariffs optimal. <
Proposition 1 states that, if a nation eliminates its tariffs against a group of countries, it will
also want to reduce its remaining tariffs – i.e., that tariffs are “complementary.” In order to show
the driving forces behind Proposition 1 and clarify its intuition, I first identify the governments’
motivations for and against protection and then show how a FTA affects each of them. To help
exposition, I indicate the tariffs against the partners by tint – although it will be zero with the FTA
in force.14 Thus, using the notation established in Proposition 1’s proof – but dropping the
subscripts M and h whenever that does not imply ambiguity – note that the effect of a marginal
change in te on government H’s (equilibrium) payoff is given by:
                                                       
13 Naturally, if M = 1, (1’) simplifies to (1) and (6’) simplifies to (6), the case without a FTA.9
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Since ¶U/¶Q = P, with some manipulation this expression can be rewritten as:
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   (7’)
From (1’) it is straightforward to see that ¶qhf/¶te < 0 and ¶qhj/¶te > 0, for j „ f. A little more
algebra ensures also that ¶P/¶te ˛ (0, 1). We can then obtain the signs of each effect generated by
varying te.
The first square bracket in (7’) represents the terms of trade effect (tot). Its first element
reflects the impact of an increase in te on home’s tot with the outside countries, tot(f), while the
second represents the effect on home’s  tot with the other FTA members,  tot(p). The former is
positive, but the latter is negative. The second square bracket represents the impact on tariff
revenue due to the shift in the volume and the origin of imports caused by a change in te. An
increase in  te reduces the volume of imports from the outside countries while increasing the
imports from the partners. Whereas the latter raises revenues proportional to  tint, a sufficient
condition for the whole expression to be negative is that  tint  £  te. The third square bracket
represents the strategic reason for protection. Once P > c, an increase in te shifts sales – and thus
profits – from the outside firms to the domestic producers. This effect is magnified by the
governments’ political economy concerns (i.e., by a b > 0). Finally, the last bracket represents the
distributive motive for protection. As long as  b > 0, a tariff benefits the government also by
increasing the local price, since a higher price shifts domestic surplus from consumers to
producers, who have a higher weight in the government’s (equilibrium) payoff function.
The sum of these factors, when set to zero, constitute the necessary (and here also
sufficient) FOC for the equilibrium  te. I compare now that FOC before and after the FTA by
analyzing the effects of changing tint = te to tint = 0 on each component of (7’). Critical for the
following discussion is the recognition that the elimination – or the reduction – of the internal
tariffs, which is what characterizes the FTA, will necessarily increase competition in the home
                                                                                                                                                                                       
14 This will also make clear that the whole argument does not really require the facilitating assumption that tint = 0 under
the FTA. In fact, as long as it is reduced by the preferential arrangement, all the paper’s qualitative results remain
unaltered.10
markets for a given external tariff. Those receiving the advantage – the partners’ firms – will then
increase sales in the home market at the expense of the local firm and of those outside the FTA.
Overall, however, aggregate sales will increase, forcing the price down. As can be inferred from
the comparative statics analysis of Dixit (1986), these kinds of effects are general, as they do not
depend on the specifics of the demand structure.15
(1) The change in the terms of trade effect
The increase in H’s tot(f) due to a marginally higher te is less significant under the FTA than
it would otherwise be, as for any given te the FTA reduces the imports from the outside countries.
On the other hand, the FTA makes the worsening of H’s tot(p) due to a higher te more significant,
as for a given te the FTA expands the imports from the partners. Thus, the FTA makes H’s tot(f)
improvement less relevant, but H’s tot(p) deterioration more critical; both push for a lower external
tariff.
(2) The loss in tariff revenue – the “tariff revenue effect”
A second force pushing for lower external tariffs arises because any increase in te tends to
raise less tariff revenue with the FTA in force than otherwise. With initial tint = te, an increase in te
would reduce qhf but would also increase qhp, which generates some tariff revenue before the FTA
and thus partially compensates the revenue loss due to a lower qhf. With the FTA, on the other
hand, tint = 0 and the increase in qhp that accompanies the reduction in qhf following an increase in te
raises no revenue. Hence, because of the loss of tariff revenue caused by the shift of imports from
those who pay duties to those who do not, the incentives to raise te are lessened under the FTA.
(3) The weakening of the strategic motive for protection – the “strategic effect”
Because for any given te the FTA increases domestic competition and lowers the local price,
it reduces also the mark-up for the home firm. As a result, any fraction of the market taken by the
local firm from the outside ones generates less profit under the FTA than it would otherwise.
Consequently, the FTA reduces the home government’s ability to use its tariff to shift foreign
profits to the local firm, thus decreasing its marginal “profit-shifting” incentives to raise te. Note
also that this “strategic effect” is stronger the more important is the government’s political
economy concerns, since this implies (in equilibrium) a more important role for profits – and thus
for the profit-shifting motive – in the tariffs’ determination process.
                                                       
15 I discuss the robustness of the assumed demand linearity more thoroughly in the Appendix.11
(4) The weakening of the distributive motive for protection – the “distributive effect”
Because for any given te the FTA reduces the local firm’s domestic sales, each increase in P
brought by a higher te becomes less valuable for the local firm, with the benefits of such increase
being partially captured by the partners’ firms. Consequently, the FTA reduces the home
government’s ability to use its tariff to shift consumers’ surplus to producers’, thus softening its
marginal  “distributive” incentives to raise te.
Those four reasons constitute the economic motivations leading to Proposition 1. They
reinforce each other at inducing governments forming a FTA to reduce their external tariffs. It is
direct to see that all of them are strengthened once the FTA is enlarged – i.e., once M increases.
Notice that, allowing for a distinct number of oligopolistic firms in each country would also be
straightforward, as the role of more firms would be similar to the role of the parameter M. For
instance, if H established a FTA with a country possessing np firms, this would be equivalent (from
H’s perspective) to a FTA with np countries having each one firm.16
It should be noted, however, that I am not the first to claim that a FTA induces a reduction
of its members’ external tariffs; Richardson (1993) and, more recently, Bagwell and Staiger (1999)
have already noted this possibility. The former shows, in a perfect competition setting, that
countries within a FTA might compete for tariff revenues generated by imports from non-
preferential sources, and that this would result in lower external tariffs. Though the model
structures are quite distinct, Richardson’s reasoning could be seen as the correspondent  of the
tariff revenue effect identified above. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) also identify a “tariff
complementarity” between tariffs applied on distinct sources of a good, in a “competing
exporters” model with fixed supply and competitive markets. In this paper’s specification, their
reasoning could be seen as analogous to the change in the terms of trade effect and the tariff
revenue effect taken together.
The weakening of the strategic and the distributive motives for protection, on the other
hand, are novel to the literature. They indicate that a “dissipation of rents” will follow the creation
of a FTA. That is, the FTA will make the shifting of rents from the foreign firms and from the local
consumers to the domestic producer more difficult. As a consequence, the latter will have less
incentive to lobby for higher tariffs under the FTA than otherwise.
                                                       
16 For example, if one wonders about NAFTA, the model would predict a reduction of Mexico’s external tariffs
considerably smaller than that of the U.S. external tariffs.12
It is true, however, that Proposition 1 need not hold for any specification. There are, in fact,
studies pointing to the other direction, i.e., suggesting that tariffs might increase as a consequence
of FTAs. Examples of these are Panagariya and Findlay (1996) and Cadot et al. (1999). Both use a
competitive 3-good-3-countries model with sector-specific capital and labor as the only common
factor. Cadot et al. use a reasoning similar to Richardson (1993) and assert that the introduction of
political economy issues  a la Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1995), when general equilibrium
effects through the labor market are taken into account, may turn Richardson’s results around.
Panagariya and Findlay, on the other hand, assume that tariffs arise from the allocation of labor
itself into lobby activities. Then, since a FTA between two countries makes lobbying for protection
against the partner innocuous, it reduces the overall demand for labor. This, in turn, reduces
wages and makes the use of labor to lobby against the third country more attractive, whence the
external tariffs tend to increase.17
Important as they may be, the model used here does not capture these kinds of general
equilibrium effects. On the other hand, the present model clarifies a wide spectrum of motivations
that might lead to the claimed external tariffs’ reduction, incorporating as special cases other
studies reaching the same result, as pointed above, while identifying the novel strategic and
distributive effects. The mitigation of the strategic and the distributive motives for protection has
also an additional – and crucial – implication. As I shall clarify in the next section, they indicate
that the political economy distortions in the governments’ tariff decisions are smaller when
countries are integrated in FTAs, whence governments will be more likely to support a welfare-
improving multilateral liberalization when countries are grouped in FTAs.
The external tariffs’ reduction is important also to indicate that countries left out of FTAs
are not necessarily worse off afterwards. Indeed, in this model the reduction is strong enough to
ensure an increase of the non-preferential imports in each of the FTA markets. This reflects the net
effect of two forces with opposite directions, from the perspective of the FTA non-members: (a)
more stringent competition within each of the FTA markets, because of the elimination of the intra-
FTA tariffs; and (b) the reduction of the external tariffs (Proposition 1). The former push qhf down,
but the latter bring it up and actually dominate (a). Hence, FTAs in economic environments like
the one studied here generate overall net “trade creation.”
                                                       
17 Assertions that external tariffs should increase once a PTA is formed are typical also in the analysis of Customs Unions
that focus on market power effects. A widely cited example of that is Krugman (1991).13
PROPOSITION 2: A FTA generates overall “trade creation,” as it induces an increase of the trade flows
between every pair of countries. More specifically, a FTA with M countries, M ˛ [2, N – 1], has the
following effects on the volumes of trade:
  (i)  The trade flows between the FTA member countries strictly increase.
  (ii)  The trade flows between the FTA member and non-member countries strictly increase.
  (iii)  The trade flows between the FTA non-member countries remain constant.
Proof:  (i) Take any pair of countries participating in the FTA. The sales from one to the other change from qhf
(from equations 1) to qhp (from equations 1’). But since ted and thd are both strictly greater than zero, the result
follows trivially from the comparison between qhf and qhp.
(ii) Take any pair of countries composed by a member and a non-member country. The sales from the former
to the latter are unaltered by the FTA, since the tariffs outside the FTA do not change. On the other hand, the
sales from the non-member to the member strictly increase with the FTA – or with its enlargement. In order
to show that, note first that the impact of the FTA on the non-member exports to the member can be































 The first term is the FTA direct effect, which is negative because of the FTA
impact on qhf through enhanced competition. The second term corresponds to the FTA indirect effect on qhf
through the change in the external tariff, which is positive because of Proposition 1. Proposition 2 states that
the second term dominates the first. But from equations (1’) and (6’), having  DEN(ted) denoting the
denominator of ted and evaluating Dqhf/DM with derivatives, calculations reveal that:
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so indeed the FTA indirect effect outweighs its direct effect on qhf.
 (iii) Since tariffs do not change outside the FTA, the result follows immediately.<
Though items (i) and (iii) are relatively straightforward, item (ii) is the most interesting –
and perhaps surprising – part of Proposition 2. Item (ii) is also in stark contrast with the results of
Krishna (1998), who uses a similar framework but concludes that FTAs cause mainly  trade
diversion, by reducing the trade flows between FTA members and non-members. Here, Proposition
2 implies the opposite, by associating FTAs with trade creation. The reason for such differences14
relies primarily on the endogeneity of tariffs, which is present here but, as indicated in the onset, is
assumed away by Krishna.18, 19
Bagwell and Staiger (1999) find that FTAs might lead to overall trade creation as well. Both
their work and this paper, however, cannot assure generality to that result. This does not mean,
however, that the result of Proposition 2 is specific to our frameworks only. As the proposition’s
proof shows, what is required is only that the FTA indirect and positive effect on qhf through the
change of the external tariff outweighs the FTA direct and negative impact on  qhf through
enhanced competition. Naturally, this might be accomplished by other specifications as well.20
Proposition 2 highlights an important role of the external tariffs’ reduction identified in
Proposition 1, as it shows that it is possible for non-members to benefit from FTAs, a contingency
usually neglected in the literature. But even without Proposition 2, it is important to note that
Proposition 1 would still ensure a shift toward it – or toward trade creation.
It is worth analyzing also the role of political economy in the trade creation result. Note
first that political economy, as manifested in the parameter b, is not critical for Propositions 1 and
2, which hold even if b = 0. However, I have already indicated that the equilibrium tariff increases
with b, as a higher b would increase the importance of both the strategic and the distributive
motives for protection. But then, considering that a FTA weakens both of these “proportional-to-b”
protectionist motivations, one may expect the FTA-induced external tariffs’ reduction and volume
of trade created to be proportional to b as well. Proposition 3, which is proved in the Appendix,
shows that this is indeed the case.
PROPOSITION 3: The FTA-induced external tariffs’ reduction and trade creation are larger the more
politically motivated are the FTA member governments.
Proposition 3 shows that, while it is true that governments more easily influenced by
political lobbies will be more protectionist, they will be also more affected by the trade-creating
aspect of a FTA. Therefore, the dissipation of rents promoted by a FTA will have its widest
consequences precisely on the originally less open economies.
The proposition could be used – and tested – also in inter-industry comparisons. It implies
that the sectors politically more active should correspond to those experiencing the widest FTA-
                                                       
18 Grossman and Helpman (1995) also find that FTAs are more likely to be formed when it generates ‘net’ trade
diversion. As Krishna (1998) – though under a quite distinct framework –, they also assume exogenous tariffs.
19 I explore the consequences of endogenizing external tariffs in Krishna’s framework more thoroughly in Ornelas (2000).
20 Although it could surely not arise in frameworks that treat the external tariffs as exogenous, as e.g. Krishna’s (1998), as
this would shutdown the indirect effect.15
induced external tariffs’ reduction and trade creation. Moreover, since the strategic motive for
protection is specific to oligopolistic settings, the proposition suggests also that those effects should
be stronger in more concentrated industries.
IV – FTAs and Multilateral Liberalization
I study now the FTAs’ effect on the prospects of multilateral liberalization (ML). I address
this question by evaluating how the membership in a FTA, and in FTAs of distinct sizes, alters the
willingness of a government to support a ML. As in Levy (1997), Krishna (1998) and McLaren
(1999), I define “multilateral liberalization” here as the elimination of all world trade barriers. This
is, nevertheless, made only to simplify the analysis, as I shall clarify below.
I remain conducting the analysis from the perspective of a representative “home country.”
The home government, when deciding whether to support a ML or not, considers the effects of
general free-trade on local welfare and on the profits of the domestic firm elsewhere, but considers
also the elimination of the lobby contributions that multilateral free-trade would imply. That is, the
government supports a ML iff its equilibrium payoff is enhanced by general free-trade, be this
criterion in accordance with the change in the national welfare or not.
Specifically, when H is within a FTA with M countries, M ˛ [1, N – 1], the analysis of
Section II applies and its government’s equilibrium payoff is given by:
      
)], ( [ )] ( [ )] ( [ ) 1 ( )] ( [ )] ( [ )] ( [
  ) (
*
1




























    (9)
where the subscript Mj indicates that foreign country j is within a FTA composed by Mj members.21
For clarity, the functional dependence of ted to M or Mj is made explicit.
Equation (9) can be rewritten in a more concise form once we denote the home country’s
local welfare – i.e., not considering export profits – by WMl [ted(M)] and its firm’s aggregate export
profits simply by PROWh [{tjd}]. Recalling also that the principal-agent specification ensures that each
government is (just) compensated by raising its own tariff beyond its optimal level [see equation
(3)], one can then respecify (9) as:
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21 Naturally, if M = 1, the home country is not within any FTA, with the same applying to foreign country j when Mj = 1.16
Under general free-trade, on the other hand, all tariffs are set to zero and there is no scope
for lobbying, so Gh(N) = WNl [0] + PROWh [{0}] ” WML. Government H will be willing to support a
multilateral agreement if Gh(N) > Gh(M), or equivalently, if:
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In contrast, a ML is welfare-improving (or “efficient”) for country H whenever:
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It is then clear from conditions (10) and (11) that governments do not face the “right”
incentives when deciding whether or not to support a ML, as they do not evaluate the status quo
regime from an efficiency perspective, but rather from the appraisal of their “politically distorted”
equilibrium payoffs. The latter, which are higher than actual national surpluses, reflect the
compensation that the governments receive to increase tariffs beyond their welfare-maximizing
levels. For government H, such distortion is critical when:
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In that case, although general free-trade would improve the country’s welfare, the government
does not want to liberalize multilaterally. So, if condition (12) holds, because government H does
not face incentives from an efficiency perspective, it makes a “wrong” decision regarding the
support of a ML.
In order to analyze the effect of FTAs on the incentives for ML, I evaluate how the
parameters’ range under which a ML improves H’s aggregate welfare, but is not supported by its
government, changes when H enters in a FTA – or enlarges its current one. It is in this sense that I
will assert that it is more or less “likely” that government H will support a ML. That is, I consider
that the narrower the range under which an efficient ML lacks the support of government H, the
less likely such event will be. Rewriting condition (12) as:
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one can then affirm that it is less likely that the home government will inefficiently choose not to
liberalize multilaterally the narrower is that interval, or equivalently, the smaller is the difference
)]. ( [ )] ( [








M - ” D 23 With that understanding, Proposition 4 then shows that the
undermining of an efficient ML becomes less likely once countries form FTAs – or enlarges their
current ones.
                                                       
22 Notice that a ML might enhance H’s welfare, but this need not be the case, as long as the trade regimes vary across
countries. If all countries shared the same trade regime (i.e., if the world were divided in symmetric FTAs – or if it did
not have any FTA) a ML would be surely welfare-improving for all countries, but otherwise this may not be the case.
23 Note that DWMl is always positive, since by definition te* is the tariff that maximizes local welfare.17
PROPOSITION 4: A government is more likely to support an efficient ML if its country is within a FTA
(or within a larger FTA) than otherwise.
The rationale behind Proposition 4 – which is proved in the Appendix – is simple. As
pointed out above, governments do not consider a ML from an efficiency perspective, since they
evaluate the status quo regime based on WMl (te*), rather than on WMl (ted). But when their countries
integrate in a (larger) FTA, because of the FTA-induced strategic and distributive effects, the
“political tariff” diverges less from the “optimal tariff” than it would otherwise. As a result, the
difference between WMl (te*) and WMl (ted) reduces and the governments’ decisions regarding the
support of ML get closer to the efficient ones.
Proposition 4 is illustrated in figure 1. The figure shows how DWMl behaves as M changes.
For (A – c) = N = 10, it displays the DWMl corresponding to b = .15, b = .25 and b = .35. In all cases,
the figure clearly shows the effect of a wider integration in diluting the impact of political economy
forces in the local welfare, which is what makes the undermining of an efficient ML less likely. The
figure also clarifies the role of the political parameter b. While the role of a FTA in raising the
support for an efficient ML is not much relevant when b is low, it gets increasing importance as b
rises. The reason is that a higher b represents “cheaper” protection, which in turn induces more
political activities – and more distortions in the government’s equilibrium payoff.
It should be noted that, as indicated in the beginning of this section, Proposition 4 is not
specific to a ML that leads to overall free-trade. Indeed, defining “multilateral liberalization” as the
(exogenous) reduction of all tariff by a%, with a ˛ (0, 100], the same analysis could be done and
the  same qualitative results would arise. This analysis would require that, rather than  ,
l
M W D
{ } { } )] ( ) 1 [( )] ( [ )] ( ) 1 [( )] ( [












M a - - - a - -  reduces with  M. I
nevertheless hang on to the simpler case of a “full” ML, since proving the general case would be
algebraically substantially more demanding but would not provide additional insights.
It is opportune here to position the Proposition 4 also within the related literature. Note
first that it shares a similarity with Staiger’s (1995) “bicycle theory.” Staiger’s main point is that a
partial trade liberalization today would facilitate future advances in the same direction. His
reasoning is that the first step induces a reallocation of workers with sector–specific skills away
from protected industries. Afterwards, those workers might lose their sector-specific skills and,
thus, their ability to obtain rents in the protected industry, hence reducing the resistance to further
liberalization. Here, though in a very distinct context, a very similar reasoning is found: a partial18
liberalization (in the form of a FTA), also by help dissipating protectionist rents, acts as a
facilitating device for further (multilateral) liberalization as well.
Proposition 4 relates also with the work of Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare (1998). Those
authors identify conditions under which a government may seek a trade agreement as a
commitment device aimed to neutralize harmful effects that political activities might have on its
long run payoff. In their paper, these harmful effects emerge because of distortions in investment
decisions that take place under protectionist regimes, and by which governments are not
compensated. Here, a trade agreement (in the form of a FTA) might prevent detrimental political
activities as well, not with respect to inefficient investment decisions, but rather those related with
the hindering of an efficient ML.
Finally, I discuss here also two of the paper’s assumptions. The first is the firms’ first-mover
advantage in the lobbying game, which as pointed out in Section II, is unessential for the paper’s
results. Although without it governments would derive strictly positive rents from the political
process, the analysis of Section III would remain entirely unaltered by such change. But since this
would increase the governments’ payoffs, they would become more willing to undermine an
efficient ML. That is, such change would increase  DWMl, implying that the obstruction of an
efficient ML would become more likely to occur. Proposition 4 would nevertheless remain intact,
as the relationship between DWMl and M would not be altered.
One may also wonder about the results’ sensitivity to changes in the lobbying game that
allowed the oligopolistic firms to lobby directly against trade agreements, either to obstruct a ML
or to avoid FTAs in the first place. The latter could happen if the firms anticipated losses due either
to the FTAs themselves or to general free-trade, since, as showed, free-trade is easier to obtain if it
follows the formation of FTAs. Such extension would require the endogenization of FTAs and
would make a ML harder to achieve, but the paper’s main qualitative results would nevertheless
tend to remain. The reason is that any effective lobby would have to compensate its government
for the losses related to the adoption of an inefficient trade regime, and this constraint would
impose a limit on such forward-looking initiatives.24
                                                       
24 In fact, I allowed the oligopolistic firms to lobby explicitly against ML in a previous version of this paper. The results of
such extension were, however, qualitatively very similar to those presented here –  and for this reason were suppressed
from this version.19
V – Concluding Remarks
I study in this paper a topic that has attracted increasing attention from trade economists in
recent years: the consequences of the spread of preferential trade arrangements for the world trade
system. Besides the positive interest that the topic certainly draws, there is also a normative reason
for its study, which is the possible redesign of the WTO rules concerning preferential trade
agreements. In order to analyze that, I use a framework based essentially on the presumption that
oligopolistic industries, while accountable for a significant fraction of the world trade flows,
constitute also central forces in the shaping of trade policies, because of both strategic reasons and
political influences that they may generate.
I examine first the “static” impact of a FTA on its members’ external tariffs and on world
trade flows, when I show that countries tend to reduce their external tariffs after joining a FTA.
Four reasons contribute for that. First, a FTA reduces the terms of trade gains of each increase in
the external tariff. Second, a FTA reduces also the tariff revenue generated by each increase in the
external tariff (the “tariff revenue effect”). Third, the profit-shifting motive for protection gets
weaker under a FTA (the “strategic effect”). And fourth, a FTA also reduces the scope for national
surplus redistribution by means of trade policies (the “distributive effect”). This external tariffs’
reduction is shown to be strong enough to enhance the trade flows between FTA members and
non-members, as compared with the pre-FTA figures. As a consequence, a FTA ensures an overall
“trade creation,” from which the outside countries benefit. I also show that, because both the
strategic and the distributive effects are reinforced when the oligopolistic firms are politically
active, the FTA-induced external tariffs’ reduction and trade created are larger the more politically
motivated are the member governments.
Because the oligopolistic firms compensate their governments for the establishment of
tariffs beyond their “optimal” levels, the governments’ decisions regarding other trade policies are
moved away from efficiency criteria. In particular, governments do not evaluate trade regimes
from an efficiency perspective because of those compensations. Such “distorted preferences”
constitute the reason that may lead to the hindering of a welfare-improving multilateral
liberalization in this model. This is possible whenever the oligopolistic firms are politically active; I
show, however, that the obstruction of an efficient ML is less likely to happen when countries are
integrated within FTAs. In such a case, the strategic and the distributive effects make political
economy less relevant in the determination of trade decisions. This, in turn, induce governments to
evaluate the costs and benefits of a ML more efficiently (i.e., less affected by special interests),20
indicating that the “dynamic” time-path impact of FTAs on the multilateral trade system seems as
favorable as their “static” consequences.
The few empirical studies aimed to evaluate the impact of PTAs, though in general not
much structural and not very conclusive, seem consistent with the general conclusions of this
paper. An example is Anderson and Norheim (1993), who find that the trade growth since the
thirties has not been impaired by the proliferation of trade agreements, though trade within
partners have increased faster – as this paper would indicate, if taken from a truly dynamic
perspective. More recently, Grether and Olarreaga (1998) also reveal trade figures in conformity
with the theoretical conclusions of this paper. They find that more open countries tend to have
larger shares of preferential trade, a result that is consistent with the results identified here –
though with an inverse causation.
Summing up, this paper suggests that considering FTAs a threat to the multilateral trade
system might constitute an exaggeration, at least when oligopolies are the main economic agents
affecting trade policy decisions. A word of caution is, nevertheless, worth mentioning. The model
used here is stylized in many aspects and does not incorporate a number of elements that are likely
to be important to a “full” analysis of the topic in question. For one, it abstracts from all kinds of
comparative advantage, as a way to make the mechanisms analyzed here more transparent. One
must, therefore, have in mind considerations like this while interpreting the paper’s results.
In any case, however, by studying FTAs under circumstances still not well explored in the
literature, though presumably quite important to the topic’s understanding, I identify motivations
that seem to support the view that FTAs might be,  yes, a “building block’ of the multilateral
system.
Appendix
(A) The effects of a FTA on a member’s external tariff under a general demand structure:
I detail here the impact of a FTA on a country’s marginal incentives to determine its external tariffs
under more general demand structures. I note also that, as long as the oligopolistic goods remain “strategic
substitutes” (i.e., ¶qki/¶qkj < 0, i „ j), the analysis would apply for heterogeneous goods as well.
The marginal effect of an increase in te on the home government’s (equilibrium) objective function is
represented by equation (7’). Applying the analysis of Dixit (1986), one obtains straightforwardly that ¶P/¶te
> 0, ¶qhf/¶te < 0 and ¶qhj/¶te > 0, j = h, p, in any “well-behaved” case – i.e., provided that stability conditions
are satisfied. As indicated in Section III, the Dixit’s analysis allows one to find also that, for a given te, the
foreign firms getting into the FTA increase their sales at H and sustain a higher aggregate consumption and a21
lower price level in that market, the simultaneous reduction of the other firms’ sales notwithstanding. With
these results, we can then obtain the signs of each effect generated by varying te when tint = 0. For that
purpose, I assume the home country FTA expands from M1 to M2 countries, with M1 < M2 < N,25 and denote
this change by DM.
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provided that ¶P/¶te < 1, the first term above are both negative, as with the first element of the two square
brackets. Therefore, sufficient conditions for the whole expression to be negative – and therefore favor a
lower external tariff under the new regime – are that D(¶P/¶te)/DM > 0 and ¶P/¶te < 1 – or at least that
D(¶P/¶te)/DM and (1 – ¶P/¶te) be not too negative. Noting that D(¶P/¶te)/DM = P``(¶Q/¶te) DQ/DM, where
P`` denotes the demand curvature and since ¶Q/¶te < 0 and DQ/DM > 0, and that ¶P/¶te > 1 only with a
sufficiently convex demand (see Dixit, 1986), the whole expression will remain negative as long as the
demand is not too convex. [In the linear demand case,  ¶P/¶te < 1 but  D(¶P/¶te)/DM < 0. The latter is,
however, not strong enough to reverse the expression’s negative sign.]
With respect to the “tariff revenue effect,” before the FTA expansion its correspondent term in (7’)
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Since ¶qhp/¶te > 0, the whole expression becomes more negative after the FTA expansion unless the change in
¶qhp/¶te is positive and large enough to overturn the FTA direct effect. [In the linear demand case,
D(¶qhp/¶te)/DM < 0, thus reinforcing the direct effect.]
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the FTA expands. Since ¶qhh/¶te > 0 and DP/DM < 0, it favors a lower external tariff unless D(¶qhh /¶te)/DM >
0 and large enough to outweigh the FTA direct effect in increasing competition and reducing the local price.
[In the linear demand case, D(¶qhh/¶te)/DM < 0, also reinforcing the direct effect.]
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the FTA expands. Since ¶P/¶te > 0 and Dqhh /DM < 0, it favors a lower external tariff unless D(¶P /¶te)/DM >
0 and large enough to offset the FTA direct effect in increasing competition and reducing the local sales of
the domestic industry. Using again the fact that  D(¶P/¶te)/DM =  P``(¶Q/¶te)  DQ/DM, this constraint is
equivalent to a demand not too concave – in contrast with the requirement on the terms of trade effect. [In the
linear demand case, D(¶P/¶te)/DM < 0, once again reinforcing the direct effect.]
                                                       
25 Naturally, if M1 = 1, this corresponds to the creation of a FTA, and otherwise it is the enlargement of an existent one.22
In summary, the paper’s results are based on the seemingly least questionable, direct effects of a FTA
– namely, that in each member country, with everything else constant, it enhances competition by offering
free access to the partners’ exporters. This, in turn, reduces the domestic and the non-member firms’ sales in
the local market, but increases the partners’ sales to an extent that suffices to ensure a reduction the local
price. All arguments used in the discussion of Proposition 1 focus on these effects. Whereas there exist other,
subtler reasons related to the demand curvature that may play in the opposite direction, it is unclear that
they could be strong enough to overturn the direct effects. Nonetheless, in the most conservative perspective,
I can at least state that the results hold if the demand is neither too convex nor too concave.
(B) Proof of Proposition 3:
The proposition states that the external tariffs’ reduction induced by a FTA should be larger when









e suffices for the proof. Calculations reveal that:
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The square bracket and DEN(ted) are both positive. But since ¶DEN(ted)/¶b = – 2(N – M) < 0, then the whole
expression (13) must be negative.
Proposition 3 asserts also that the higher is b, the more trade a FTA will create. In order to show that,
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This is certainly positive, as ¶DEN(ted)/¶b < 0 but all other terms are positive.<
(C) Proof of Proposition 4:
Mathematically, what the proposition states is that DWMl is inversely related to M. In order to show
that, I substitute ted [from (6’)] and te* (which corresponds to ted when b = 0) into the definition of local welfare
to find, respectively, WMl(ted) and WMl(te*). After substantial manipulation, DWMl can be expressed in terms of
the primitive parameters of the model as:
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Then, an integer, showing that the derivative of (15) with respect to M is everywhere negative, for M
˛ [1, N – 1], suffices for the proof. Calculating that derivative and manipulating, one finds that:23
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The first multiplicative term of (16) is clearly negative and the second term’s denominator is surely
positive, so the whole expression is negative iff the latter’s numerator is positive. Expressing it as (A)M2 +
(B)M – (C), it is straightforward to see that A, B and C are all positive expressions that do not contain M.
Therefore, the numerator is negative only if C is large relative to (A)M2 and (B)M, which is more likely to
occur when M = 1. Imposing M = 1 on that expression, it reduces to ). 10 7 ( ) 12 34 ( ) 2 5 (
2 b N b N b + - + + -  It
is then easy to see that,  " N ‡ 3, the numerator is, indeed, strictly positive.
Hence, DWMl necessarily decreases with M and the creation of a FTA (or its enlargement) ensures
that the participating governments will be, indeed, more willing to support an efficient ML.<
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